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Abstract
The standard approach to policy-making and advice in economics implicitly or ex-
plicitly ignores politics and political economy, and maintains that if possible, any market
failure should be rapidly removed. This essay explains why this conclusion may be incor-
rect; because it ignores politics, this approach is oblivious to the impact of the removal of
market failures on future political equilibria and economic e¢ ciency, which can be delete-
rious. We rst outline a simple framework for the study of the impact of current economic
policies on future political equilibria and indirectly on future economic outcomes. We
then illustrate the mechanisms through which such impacts might operate using a series
of examples. The main message is that sound economic policy should be based on a
careful analysis of political economy and should factor in its inuence on future political
equilibria.
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The fundamental approach to policy prescription in economics derives from the recog-
nition that the presence of market failures like externalities, public goods, monopoly, and
imperfect competition creates room for well-designed public interventions to improve so-
cial welfare. This tradition, already clear in Pigou (1912), was elaborated by Samuelson
(1947), and still provides the basis of most policy advice provided by economists. For
example, the rst development economists in the 1950s used market failure inspired ideas
as the intellectual basis for the need for government intervention to promote development
in poor countries (Killick 1978). Though belief in the ability of the government or the
e¤ectiveness of aid has waxed and waned, current approaches to development problems
have much in common with this early tradition, even if they have become more sophis-
ticated: in recognizing second-best issues, for instance, by incorporating informational
frictions explicitly in policy design (for example, Townsend, 2011); in highlighting the
specicity of the appropriate policy depending on context (for example, Rodrik, 2007);
and in emphasizing the role of rigorous empirical methods in determining which sorts of
interventions can be e¤ective (for eample, Banerjee and Duo, 2011). But in all of these
approaches, politics is largely absent from the scene.
This neglect of politics is often justied implicitly or explicitly in one of three ways.
The rst is to maintain that politicians are basically interested, or induced to be interested,
in promoting social welfare, for example, because socially e¢ cient policy is what helps
politicians to stay in power or get re-elected in models like Whitman (1989, 1995) and
Mulligan and Tsui (2006, 2008).
The second is to view politics as a random factor, just creating potentially severe but
unsystematic grit on the wheels of economic policymaking (for example, Sachs, 2005, or
Banerjees, 2012, argument that the Liberian dictator Samuel Does economic policies
were disastrous because he did not understand what was involved in being president).
The third justication recognizes that political economy matters, but maintains that
good economics is good politics,meaning that good economic policies necessarily relax
political constraints (for example, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995, and Banerjee and
Duo, 2011, in particular, p. 261, or Sachs et al., 2004). The implication is the same as the
rst two views: one could unwaveringly support good economic policies, assured that they
will not only solve market failures but also unleash benecial political forces whatever
those may be.
In this essay, we argue not only that economic advice will ignore politics at its peril
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but also that there are systematic forces that sometimes turn good economics into bad
politics, with the latter unfortunately often trumping the economic good. Of course, we
are not claiming that economic advice should shy away from identifying market failures
and creative solutions to them, nor are we suggesting a blanket bias away from good
economic policy. Rather, our argument is that economic analysis needs to identify, theo-
retically and empirically, conditions under which politics and economics run into conict,
and then evaluate policy proposals taking this conict and the potential backlashes it
creates into account.
Our basic argument is simple: the extant political equilibrium may not be indepen-
dent of the market failure; indeed it may critically rest upon it. Faced with a trade union
exercising monopoly power and raising the wages of its members, most economists would
advocate removing or limiting the unions ability to exercise this monopoly power, and
this is certainly the right policy in some circumstances. But unions do not just inuence
the way the labor market functions; they also have important implications for the po-
litical system. Historically, unions have played a key role in the creation of democracy
in many parts of the world, particularly in Western Europe; they have founded, funded
and supported political parties, such as the Labour Party in Britain or the Social De-
mocratic parties of Scandinavia, which have had large impacts on public policy and on
the extent of taxation and income redistribution, often balancing the political power of
established business interests and political elites. Because the higher wages that unions
generate for their members are one of the main reasons why people join unions, reducing
their market power is likely to foster de-unionization. But this may, by further strength-
ening groups and interests that were already dominant in society, also change the political
equilibrium in a direction involving greater e¢ ciency losses. This case illustrates a more
general conclusion, which is the heart of our argument: even when it is possible, removing
a market failure need not improve the allocation of resources because of its impact on
future political equilibria. To understand whether it is likely to do so, one must look at
the political consequences of a policy it is not su¢ cient to just focus on the economic
costs and benets.
To develop this argument more fully, we o¤er a simple theoretical framework clarifying
the links between economic policy and the political equilibrium. We emphasize why, in
the presence of political economy considerations, economic cost-benet analysis is not
su¢ cient, and also how, in contrast to standard second-best reasoning, our argument
provides some pointers for what types of market failures, if removed, are most likely to
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have deleterious impacts on the political equilibrium. We highlight economic policies that
strengthen the already dominant groups in society conversely, weakening their political
counterweights as those that need to be studied more holistically, combining politics
with economics, to avoid major unintended political consequences.
We then discuss three broad mechanisms generating circumstances under which good
economic policy may make bad politics. First, economic rents in the present can a¤ect
political equilibria. This in particular implies that policies that, in the process of solving
market failures, reduce the economic rents for certain groups may have unintended po-
litical consequences, particularly when the rents that are destroyed are those of groups
that are already weak, further tilting the balance of power in society. Second, even in
the absence of changing rents, the distribution of income can e¤ect the political equilib-
rium, which implies that the distributional e¤ects of the policies that enhance economic
e¢ ciency cannot be ignored for an additional, political reason. Once again, policies that
lead to a further increase in inequality would be the ones most likely to have counterpro-
ductive political implications. Third, political incentive compatibility constraints, which
determine the interests a politician has to satisfy, may be violated for certain groups as a
result of removing market failures, creating a political backlash. In each case, we provide
a few examples to illustrate the mechanisms in action.
At this point, our mechanisms are mainly illustrative. Our purpose is to show that
the issues highlighted by our framework are present in a number of important historical
and current episodes, and that there are some important commonalities consistent with
a basic political economy approach in particular, linking the counterproductive political
implications to economic policies that improve the standing of already dominant groups
and interests in society. It goes without saying that a more systematic empirical and the-
oretical analysis of these issues is necessary to uncover the major regularities and lessons,
enrich our views of how economics and politics interact, and delineate the circumstances,
if any, where economists can go on abstracting from politics.
A Simple Framework
To assist in clarifying these ideas and to organize the discussion of mechanisms in the next
section, consider a two-period model. Suppose an economic policy has to be chosen in
both periods and there are no economic linkages between these two periods. In addition
suppose that in the rst period politicians have some freedom of choice over policy in
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some sense there is a window of policy opportunity so that policy is not completely
determined by vested interests or some political calculations. This policy choice might
also be inuenced by advice from economists, for example, aimed at correcting a market
failure. In the second period, policies will be determined in a political equilibrium.
Let us rst focus on the world of economics without politics, where there is no
political linkage between the two periods. In such a world, the rst-period policy choice
can be made without any concern for the political equilibrium in the second period.1
However, the reality is that policy choices in the rst period often strengthen some groups
and weaken others, and thus will likely a¤ect the political equilibrium in the second period.
In turn, the political equilibrium will determine the choices made in the second period.
Therefore, the objective of the welfare maximizing policy maker, and the advice given
by economists, should not just be to solve market failures today, but should take into
account the later political ramications of this rst period choice.2
The argument so far is similar to a political version of the famous second-best caveat to
economic policy analysis (Lancaster and Lipsey, 1956). But there is often more that can be
said. Much political economy analysis highlights the role of the balance of political power
in society, emphasizing in particular that (1) economic and political power are linked;
and (2) the political dominance of a narrow interest group or segment of society will have
1Mathematically, in the world of economics without politics,policies in the two periods, x1 and x2,
are chosen independently to maximize welfare,
P2
t=1Wt(xt) (where discounting is suppressed without
any loss of generality). Here Wt captures social welfare in period t. In this case, the social welfare
maximizing policy/advice in the rst period would be xSW1 such that W
0
1
 
xSW1

= 0.
2Mathematically, we can think of second-period policy being determined as x2 =  (p2), where p2
is an index of the distribution of political power in the second period. This distribution of political
power is itself determined in part by todays policies, which can be summarized by a function , so that
p2 =  (x1).
In contrast to the situation in footnote 1, social welfare maximization in this world, where economic
policies and politics in the future are endogenous, will require (assuming di¤erentiability):
W 01 (x1) +W
0
2 ( ( (x1)))
d ( (x1))
dp2
d (x1)
dx1
= 0:
Therefore, unless d=dp2 = 0 (so that future policies are independent of future politics) or d=dx1 = 0
(so that future politics is independent of todays policies), the second term in this equation will be
non-zero, implying that the objective of the welfare maximizing policy maker, and the advice given by
economists, should not just be to solve market failures today, but should factor in politics.
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deleterious e¤ects (for example, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In this light, it is policies
that economically strengthen already dominant groups, or weaken those that are acting as
a counterbalance to them, that are especially likely to tilt the balance of political power
further and have unintended, counterproductive implications.3 In addition, economic
reforms that leave the fundamental political and institutional sources of ine¢ ciencies
unchanged and instead deal with some of their symptoms in a supercial way also risk a
political backlash by violating political incentive compatibility constraints e¤ectively
destroying existing political equilibria or coalitions. We show later how this has been an
endemic problem with policy reform in Africa.
Of course the devil is in the details. How might current economic policy choices a¤ect
future political equilibria? How do political equilibria a¤ect the level of welfare that will
be achieved in the future? Clearly, these e¤ects may di¤er across settings, like democracies
vs. nondemocracies, but we will argue that in many instances they seem to be present
and of rst-order importance.
The Organizational Importance of Economic Rents
Economic rents create incentives to organize in particular, to extract and/or take ad-
vantage of those rents or to protect them. The existence of organizations has potentially
powerful political consequences. thus Thus, eradicating market failures and removing the
resulting rents will often change investments in organizations by certain individuals and
groups, and via this channel inuence the political equilibrium. This intuition suggests
that economic policy-making should take into account or at least study the impact of
3Following up on footnote 2, one rst needs to order policies, for example, such that higher x favors
the already politically powerful groups. With this ordering, denote the status quo policies which will
apply without any intervention by x01 and x
0
2. Suppose that x
0
2 > x
SW
2 , so that the status quo in the
future is already biased in favor of the politically powerful, and that p2 increases (shifts in favor of the
dominant groups) when x1 increases. Then any policy reform that involves x1 > x01 (so that it favors
the politically powerful relative to the status quo today) will tend to increase p2 and shift the political
equilibrium in the second period further to the benet of the politically powerful, leading to yet higher
values of x2 (thus increasing the gap between actual and socially optimal policies in the second period).
Our framework suggests that the political consequences of these types of policies should be carefully
studied.
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policy on the political organization of various groups.
Rents, Unionization and Democracy
In most situations, unions clearly create economic distortions by pushing the wages of
their members up relative to non-unionized employees. Unions may also create other
distortions, like discouraging employers from adopting certain technologies and e¢ ciency-
enhancing practices. As a result, reducing the power of unions to push up wages is
often mainstream economic advice. The counterarguments rooted in economic theory
typically refer either to the role of unions in securing a more equal distribution of income,
especially by improving the pay of lower-wage workers, or to arguments that rms have
some monopsony power in setting wages and unions can counterbalance that power.
In the context of our framework, the key point is that any policy choice that reduces
the ability of unions to push for high wages even if it does not involve directly mak-
ing it harder to organize unions will indirectly reduce union activity. After all, many
workers may no longer nd joining unions worthwhile when the premium they receive is
limited. In the context of our framework, todays policies a¤ect tomorrows organizational
investments and thus the distribution of political power in this case the power of unions.
Moreover, in many settings, despite the power of unions in the status quo, the balance of
power is already tilted in favor of large employers so that weakening unions might create
a more tilted balance of political power in society, with the potential dynamic costs that
this will engender.
This is because, as we have already noted, unions do not just ght for higher wages
or attempt to inuence the internal organization of rms; they have also been very active
politically in ways that seem likely to a¤ect the political equilibrium. One of the most
important consequences of the political power of unions is the role they have played in cre-
ating and supporting democratic institutions around the world, particularly starting from
a situation in which political power was very unequally distributed in a non-democratic
context. A recent literature on the factors inuencing the creation of democracy has
moved away from earlier work, such as that of Moore (1966) which emphasized the role
of the middle class or the bourgeoisie,and has instead pointed out that it is often the
working classes or poor segments of society that have played a dening role in the emer-
gence and ourishing of democracy (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Collier
and Mahoney 1997; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006). This literature argues that the
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extent to which the working class is organized or able to engage in collective action is
critical for its ability to push for institutional change. Since unions are in the business
of organizing working people, it makes sense that the presence of unions should facilitate
collective action that pushes for regime change. A great deal of case study and econo-
metric research supports this emphasis on social conict (for example, Aidt and Jensen,
2012).
The examples where unions have played a pivotal role in democratization range from
the rst wave of democratizationin Europe prior to World War I (Eley, 2002) through
the battle of Solidarity against the communist regime in Poland, to the ght against
the Apartheid regime in South Africa by the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU). One of the clearest recent cases is the formation of the Workers Party (PT)
in Brazil in 1979. This party emerged in the context of a strike at the Scânia truck factory
in São Bernardo. The leader of the São Bernardo metalworkers was a 33 year-old activist
called Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, also known as Lula, who helped to organize what was the
rst in a series of strikes which swept across Brazil, challenging the military dictatorship.
On the face of it these strikes were about wages and working conditions, but as Lula later
recalled: I think we cant separate economic and political factors ... The ... struggle was
over wages, but in struggling for wages, the working class won a political victory(quoted
in Keck, 1992, p. 65). Formed the year after the strike, the PT was in the vanguard of
the successful movement to force the military from power in Brazil.
In summary, policies reducing the e¤ectiveness of unions in negotiating over wages
and working conditions for their members will reduce their political power. Though Lula
and COSATUmanaged to organize in hostile political environments, the evidence suggests
that unionization rates are sensitive to government policies which facilitate the creation of
monopoly power and rents (see Rothstein, 1992, Western, 1999, Schmitt and Mitukiewicz,
2012). If the political power of unions is important in supporting a range of other economic
and political outcomes, then correcting the labor market failures associated with union-
induced high wages may backre.
This perspective can also be applied to U.S. experience with unions. The share of U.S.
workers belonging to a union peaked back in the early 1950s. There was an element of
policy choice here: after encouraging the growth of unions with the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act) in 1935 and by various actions during World
War II, the bargaining environment became less favorable for unions with the passage of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act). Moreover, starting
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in the 1970s, policies that encouraged free trade increased the level of competition in the
U.S. economy, undercutting the ability of a number of private-sector unions to raise wages.
Of further signicance was the anti-union stance of the Reagan administration (see Farber
and Western, 2002, for the legacy of this). The decline in union membership may have
had various political economy consequences, including being an important contributing
factor to the rise in income inequality (Western and Rosenfeld, 2011). More speculatively,
it may have also contributed to the explosion in compensation of chief executive o¢ cers
(DiNardo, Hallock and Pischke, 1997, 2000) and to the rapid deregulation of the nancial
sector.
Consequences of the Organization of Resource Wealth
A popular argument claims that the specic form of a countrys natural resources have a
rst-order impact on economics and politics. Botswanas deep-mined diamonds, according
to this argument, have di¤erent consequences for political stability than Sierra Leones
alluvial diamonds (Ross, 2006). However, the consequences of minerals can depend not
so much on their intrinsic characteristics or on whether their extraction is organized
e¢ ciently from an economic point of view, but on the political consequences of how their
exploitation is structured. We illustrate this with the comparison of the exploitation of
the alluvial gold deposits of Australia and the diamond deposits of Sierra Leone. In both
cases, for basic economic reasons, free entry into mining was ine¢ cient. Natural resource
extraction is a clear case of congestion: the more others extract, the less will be left
for each. One way to address this market failure is to assign exclusive property rights to
the natural resources to a large producer, who would plan long-term and eliminate the
dissipation of rents that is likely to arise through excessive entry. Another way to organize
mining is to allow large numbers of individuals or small rms to search for the resources,
possibly subject to registration or other fees.
That the political consequences of the economic organization of mineral extraction
may be more important than their direct economic consequences is illustrated by the
contrast of the Australian and Sierra Leonean histories. The Australian case suggests
that when a large number of independent, small-scale miners realize their rents may be
dissipated, this encourages their political organization as a group, ultimately creating
a more balanced political landscape and contributing to the development of democratic
politics.the risk of dissipation of the rents of a large number of independent, small-scale
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miners may contribute to their political organization as a group, ultimately creating a
more balanced political landscape and contributing to the development of democratic
politics. On the other side, Sierra Leones experience showcases how the prevalence of
large and very protable mining interests, as well as the political inghting to control and
benet from these mining interests, often has negative and non-democratic implications
for the distribution of political power.
In Australia, gold was discovered in New South Wales and then in the newly formed
state of Victoria in 1851. The immediate reaction of Australian political elites was to try
to ban gold mining in the fear that the labor force on farms and ranches would vanish.
If gold mining was to be allowed, it would be only after proper surveys had been made
and the land leased out to large enterprises (Hirst, 2008, p. 375). But the gold was on
Crown land, and as such outside the direct control of the elites in the Legislative Assembly
of New South Wales, who could neither get mining banned nor allocated in large lots.
The concerns of the British colonial state about the growing power of local Australian
economic and political elites led to the decision to allow anyone to take out a mining
license as long as they paid 30 shillings per month. Though this fee was high, it did not
stop a massive gold rush. Soon 50 percent of the men in Victoria were working in the
gold elds. Of Melbournes 40 police constables, 38 resigned to go and dig gold. Ships
were unable to sail from Melbournes harbor because their crews deserted (Blainey 2006,
p. 40).
As Australias mining camps spread, resentment grew about the license, which had
to be paid whether or not the miner found gold, and further restrictions were placed on
the size of claims miners could stake. Punishments were also increased for those found
without a license. The miners began to organize to protect their interests and increase
their rents by reducing mining licenses. In 1854, they founded the Ballarat Reform League
in the town of that name in the middle of the goldelds. In November 1854, the diggers
in Ballarat delivered a set of Resolutionsto the governor which were heavily inspired
by the agenda of the Chartists, a movement of working-class people seeking greater
political participation in Britain. (Indeed, the secretary of the Ballarat Reform League,
John Hum¤ray, had been a Chartist in Wales before emigrating to Australia.) The
demands included manhood su¤rage, no property requirements to become a member of
the Victorian Legislative Council and payment of its members (Hirst, 2002, p. 48). They
also demanded an end to licenses and the disbanding of the commissioners who collected
the license fees on the goldelds. A group of miners, diggersas they were known, led
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by Peter Lalor, decided to refuse to pay for their licenses, took up arms, and built a
stockade at Eureka. On December 3, 1854 armed police stormed it. Thirty diggers and
ve policemen died.
In the outrage that followed, a Royal Commission recommended reform of the license
system, also xing a fee of one pound for a yearly license. Under the 1853 Victoria
Constitution, someone in possession of an annual mining license was deemed to have
su¢ cient wealth to be eligible to vote. Thus, at one fell swoop, any digger willing to
pay one pound and many were was enfranchised. At the same time, to further placate
the diggers, the Legislative Council was expanded to allow for representation from the
goldelds. In 1855 Hum¤ray and Lalor were elected to the Victoria Legislative Council
along with six other diggers. In March 1856, the Legislative Council introduced the
worlds rst e¤ective secret ballot, henceforth known as the Australian Ballot.All eight
diggers voted in favor and the measure passed by 33 votes to 25 (Hirst, 2006).
The contrast between the Australian experience, where the organization of gold de-
posits created a large pro-democratic force, and that in Sierra Leone is striking. Prospect-
ing for diamonds began in Sierra Leone in the 1920s, with the rst discoveries being made
in 1931. Small scale mining started in 1933 in the east of the country, and in 1935 the
colonial government gave the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) practically exclusive
prospecting and mining rights for the entire country. To protect these rights from illegal
Mining, SLST had its own security force. In his study, van der Lann (1965, p. 79) poses
the question: What is better for the Sierra Leone economy: to have the diamond deposits
slowly and steadily exploited by a mining company, or rapidly worked by diggers?He
argues that the SLST was (economically) better both because the recovery rate of the
diggers ... falls far short of the rate of close to 100% achieved by SLST(p. 80), and also
because the SLST monopoly generated more revenues for the government.
Yet the really important feature of the organization of the diamond mining in Sierra
Leone was not the economic costs and benets of SLST, but its political consequences.
Though SLST struggled to control illegal mining by diggers, the organization of the mining
did not create the type of democratic impulse as it had in Australia. One consequence of
this was that the independence movement of the 1950s was spearheaded by paramount
chiefs and other elites favored by British colonialism. In 1952, when these elite Sierra
Leoneans began to control the Legislative Council, they chose not to open up diamond
mining to Sierra Leoneans, but rather to extract greater taxes from the SLST. In exchange,
they helped to enforce the monopoly rights by aggressively punishing illegal mining. The
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Minister of Mines in charge of this was the future kleptocratic prime minister and president
of Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens. In 1956, the number of illegal diggers had become so
large possibly 75,000 (van der Laan 1965, p. 65) that security forces were overwhelmed.
SLSTs monopoly was now restricted to two areas, but these were still the prime deposits
of Kono and Tongo Fields. Elsewhere, mining licenses were issued but not to strangers
meaning anyone who was not an indigenous resident of the chieftaincy where the mining
was to take place.
Naturally, as discussed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), there were other historical
and institutional factors stacking the cards against the development of the type of inclusive
economic and political institutions and policies that would have stimulated economic
growth in Sierra Leone. But the arrangements that had been made for accessing natural
resources were a key contributor to the fact that during the critical period of the founding
of the rst political parties in Sierra Leone, they were formed by elites, particularly by
the Paramount Chiefs and those connected to them, without the input of the broad mass
of Sierra Leoneans (Cartwright, 1970, for an overview). The scene was set for the creation
of one-party and authoritarian rule after independence in 1961.
Political Consequences of Inequality
Removing a market failure will also generally alter the distribution of income in society.
For example, when unions are less able to exercise monopoly power, not only will their
organization dwindle, but (at least in the absence of robust competition) prots will rise.
Income will be typically redistributed from workers to the managers and owners of rms.
This shift will also inuence the political equilibrium, however.
An example of how an altered distribution of income can have a rst-order impact
on future politics is provided by the e¤ect of Atlantic trade opportunities on the English
political system in the seventeenth century. Because Atlantic trading activities were
not the monopoly of the Crown in England at this time, this trade was dominated by
independent merchants, adventurers and privateers. Prots from Atlantic trade enriched
many of these men, who opposed the Stuart monarchss absolutism and sought to limit the
Crowns prerogatives. As they became richer, they also became more powerful and bolder,
and were even able to eld armies to defeat the monarchy in the English Civil War of the
1640s and then during the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2005) and Jha (2010) provide historical and empirical evidence linking the rise of inclusive
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institutions in England and the Dutch Republic to the rise of merchants and industrialists
beneting from Atlantic trade. Tellingly, this trajectory is very di¤erent than the one
observed in Portugal or Spain, where Atlantic trading activities were monopolized and
allocated by the Crown. In these countries, the riches of trade owed into the co¤ers of the
already dominant monarchs, strengthening the monarchy, weakening their parliaments,
and contributing to the tilted balance of political power, which persisted and underpinned
the lack of economic and political development in these parts of Western Europe.
Money and Politics in the United States
The experience of nancial deregulation over the past 30 years in the United States, as
analyzed by Johnson and Kwak (2010), provides an illustration of how economic policy
designed with a disregard for political implications can be injurious to social welfare. The
system of nancial and banking regulation which emerged from the Great Depression had
many features that were irrational from a purely economic viewpoint. These included
the prohibition of interstate banking and the separation of commercial from investment
banking. Jayaratne and Strathan (1996), among others, found that the removal of some
of these banking restrictions spurred rapid economic growth. Such reforms are akin to
those directly addressing market failures in the sense that they were removing distortions
partly introduced by previous policies. But, in common with the other economic policies
with potentially counterproductive political consequences, these reforms also tended to
strengthen an already powerful constituency, the nancial sector.
Financial degulation started small, for example, ending xed commissions on stock
trading in 1975. Then in 1980 Regulation Q, which limited interest rates on savings
accounts, was abolished. As Johnson and Kwak (2010) argue, while the banking and -
nancial services industry was not powerful enough at this time to get all the deregulation
it wanted, it was strong enough to block new regulation. This was relevant because consid-
erable nancial innovation was starting to take place: as one example, Salomon Brothers
originated interest rate swaps in 1981. As these new nancial instruments developed, and
as regulations that limited what nancial services banks could perform were incrementally
relaxed during this time by regulators and courts, the nancial sector became bigger and
more protable. Between 1980 and 2005, nancial sector prots grew 800 percent in real
terms, while nonnancial prots rose by 250 percent (Johnson and Kwak, 2010, Chapter
3). Between 1998 and 2007, nancial sector prots were on average about 30 percent of
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total prots in the private sector. During this period, the nancial sector went from 3.5
percent to almost 6 percent of GDP.
As the banks got bigger and more protable, they also became more assertive and
inuential. They started to lobby more and contribute more to political campaigns.
While in 1990 the nancial sector donated $61 million dollars to political campaigns, by
2006 this was $260 million (the industry which was the next largest donor, health care,
gave only $100 million in 2006). Of course, rising wealth and campaign contributions
were not the only source of rising political power for the nancial industry. There was a
revolving door between Wall Street and executive appointments in Washington as well.
As Johnson and Kwaak (2010) point out, there was also an intellectual revolution in
academic nance involving the pricing of derivative nancial instruments and a body of
studies arguing for deregulation, all of which was interpreted as bolstering the nancial
sectors position.
So nancial deregulation continued. In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching E¢ ciency Act relaxed constraints on inter-state banking and led to a series of
mergers which constructed large nationwide banks. JPMorgan Chase and Citicorp were
formed, and the Bank of America transformed. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
e¤ectively codied the demolition of most of the barriers between commercial and invest-
ment banking, barriers that had already been falling incrementally for several decades
as a result of regulatory and court decisions. But perhaps more important than these
changes was the avoidance of regulations: for example, regulations that might have al-
tered how accountants and regulators treated the collateralized debt obligations based on
mortgage-backed securities and the credit default swaps sold by insurance companies like
the American Insurance Group (AIG). The political power of the nancial industry also
accentuated the moral hazard problemin nance that large nancial institutions can
take risks expecting to be bailed out by the government when things get bad. Ultimately,
these regulatory changes and the regulatory void, in conjunction with the moral hazard
problem, created an environment which encouraged excessive risk-taking and contributed
to the 2007-2008 nancial crisis.
In terms of our framework, this account illustrates how potentially e¢ ciency-enhancing
deregulation may have increased the size and political power of the nancial industry,
which then altered the structure of future regulations and allocations in favor of the
nancial industry, with potentially adverse consequences for the rest of society. Put dif-
ferently, the analysis of these economic policies which focused only on their economic costs
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and benets but did not take into account the political consequences of the changes they
unleashed, dramatically understated the likelihood of the costs that actually occurred.
Russian Privatization
Most economists favor privatization of industry, and few argue that government ownership
of industry is e¢ cient from a cost and benet perspective. Like deregulation, privatization
is also proposed as a way of improving economic e¢ ciency by reversing existing (often
government-imposed) distortions. Yet the privatization of rms in Russia during the
1990s is another example of a policy with a major e¤ect on income distribution, creating
a group of very wealthy individuals and putting in motion signicant political changes
not only in terms of the direct negative consequences of the policy, but also in terms of the
potential weakening of the reform process and the backlash that these policies created,
paving the way for the rise of Vladimir Putins authoritarian regime.
In the summer of 1991, Boris Yeltsin won the election for the newly created Russian
presidency. His platform, on the basis of which he beat four Communists and a hardcore
nationalist, included a radical program of market-oriented reform. To implement it, he
picked Yegor Gaidar, who in turn asked Anatoly Chubais to be in charge of privatization.
Of all the policies that Yeltsin wanted to implement, the privatization of the countrys
thousands of state-owned rms was perhaps the most critical; but he had no specic plan
about how to accomplish it. Gaidar and Chubais came up with a strategy to put the
main assets of the Soviet Union into private hands.
Starting in the spring of 1992, small rms like stores and restaurants began to be sold
o¤. People could take ownership of their own apartment for free or almost for free. In
late 1992, Chubais turned to the big rms. Yeltsins team tried to get the public involved
in this initial distribution of assets. Large and medium sized enterprises were required
to sell 29 percent of their shares in voucher auctions, and in October 1992, each Russian
adult was issued vouchers with a nominal value of 10,000 rubles; ones vouchers could
be acquired at a local bank for a fee of just 25 rubles. By January 1993, 97 percent of
Russians had claimed their vouchers. These vouchers could be sold or used to bid for the
shares of specic companies when they privatized. The rst voucher auctions were held in
December 1992, and in total, about 14,000 enterprises held such auctions. However, most
assets of these rms went to their workers and managers. The law allowed for workers
and managers to buy 51 percent of the voting shares of a rm at a discount and using
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the rmsown funds. In e¤ect, the majority of privatizing rmsassets were handed to
insiders at huge discounts.
The most controversial stage of the privatization and in hindsight the most clearly
deleterious was the loans-for-shares deal in 1995. State shares in twelve highly protable
enterprises concentrated in the energy sector were used as collateral for bank loans. If the
loans were not paid o¤, and the government never had any intention of paying them o¤,
the banks would have the right to sell the shares. Between November 1996 and February
1997, sales happened for the shares of several large rms including Yukos, Sidanko and
Surgutneftegaz, and in each case, the shares were bought by the banks themselves in
auctions where outside bids were ignored or disqualied. Freeland (2000) and Ho¤man
(2002) provide overviews of these events and a description of the resulting rise of the
oligarchs. Not only did this type of privatization massively enrich and empower the
oligarchs, but it also failed to create a large number of small shareholders. In 1994, workers
owned 50 percent of the average Russian enterprise; by 1999, this gure had dropped to
36 percent. By 2005, 71 percent of medium and large industry and communications
enterprises had a single shareholder who owned half the stock (Treisman, 2011, pp. 223-
224).
The driving force behind privatization was textbook economics, to move Russia from
central planning and state ownership to a much more e¢ cient market economy. This was
certainly the view of many economists at the time, and the main debate was about how
fast to privatize (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994), not whether to maintan state ownership
or not (for example, arguments that privatization might create a private monopoly, with
even worse economic consequences than public ownership, as suggested by Borenstein,
2002, in the context of California, were not commonly raised, though since then some,
including Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova, 2000, Stiglitz, 2002, and Goldman, 2003, have
argued against privatization on purely economic grounds). To the extent that economists
worried about the political economy of the process, they did not consider that privatiza-
tion might have adverse political consequences. Rather, they focused on how to structure
the transition so that the political coalition in favor of privatization would stay on track
(Dewatripont and Roland, 1992), or on the ex ante political constraints shaping the form
of privatization (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). In fact, a common view was that the
particular details of Russias privatization were not of rst-order importance, essentially
because of the good economics is good politicsargument. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny
(1995, pp. 10-11), for example, asserted: [A]t least in Russia, political inuence over
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economic life was the fundamental cause of economic ine¢ ciency, and the principal ob-
jective of economic reform was, therefore, to depoliticize economic life ... Privatization
fosters depoliticization because it robs politicians of control over rms.
There is indeed evidence that Russias privatization was initially good for the economy,
and even the oligarchs appear to have at rst invested heavily in their new rms (Treisman
2011, Åslund, 2007 Chapter 6). For example, Shleifer and Treisman (2004, p. 29) ask:
Have the oligarchs stripped assets from the companies they acquired in privatization,
rather than investing in them? The audited nancial statements of these companies
suggest that their assets have grown dramatically, especially since 1998 ... And the major
oligarchs have been investing hundreds of millions of dollars annually in their companies
. . . 
But our emphasis here is on the political consequences of the privatization, which
turned out to be highly damaging. The privatization enriched and also temporarily po-
litically empowered a group of unscrupulous oligarchs; in fact, so much so that there was
a signicant increase in Russian inequality following privatization (Alexeev 1999). Even
more importantly, the economic and political inequality it created induced a backlash
against the process of economic and political reform in Russia, ultimately re-creating au-
thoritarianism and rmly entrenching a form of state-led crony capitalism (see Guriev
and Sonin, 2008, for a theoretical analysis). There are several layers to understanding
how this political equilibrium evolved. First, privatization failed to create the type of
broad distribution of assets which would have provided the economic underpinning for
the nascent democracy and socially desirable economic policies. Second, the distribution
of gains was not just narrow, it was illegitimate because the large increase in inequality
favored the politically enterprising and the connected. Third, the concentrated nature
of the assets which emerged from this process and the huge rents that were up for grabs
made it very easy for the KGB, re-energized under the leadership of Putin, to wrestle back
control of the economy. Finally, the way in which the privatization took place may have
undermined the incentives of the oligarchs to push for better institutions (Sonin 2003),
and may also have fueled popular support for Putins political strategy.
Our bottom line on the experience of Russian privatization is that a purely economic
approach to moving from collectively to privately owned assets turned out to be woefully
inadequate as was a political economy approach based on the assertion that good eco-
nomics is good politics. The evidence instead suggests that privatization, particularly
its form, had a dening impact on Russian politics and contributed to the rise of an
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authoritarian and repressive regime ruling over a much more unequal society.
Violating Political Incentive Constraints
Politicians are often constrained by political incentive compatibility constraints. These
determine the expected utility that a political leader in power must obtain himself or give
to organized interests if he or she wishes to stay in power. Yet removing market failures,
without recognizing and addressing the fundamental political and institutional sources of
distortions, may violate these constraints. Put di¤erently, a set of policies which may seem
deeply misguided by the standards of basic textbook economics may nonetheless be serving
the political economy purpose of holding together a governing coalition. By implication,
removing such market failures can weaken existing coalitions or disrupt equilibria. The
result may be the rise of new coalitions or new types of equilibria, which might reinstate
the market failures or create new ones, because they are useful in binding together the
governing coalition or creating rents for the rulers. This type of re-creation of distortions
was dubbed the seesaw e¤ectin Acemoglu, Johnson, Querubín and Robinsons (2008)
study of central bank independence under weak institutions. But more ominously, the
results of violating political incentive compatibility constraints might also be a period
of civil unrest, with high costs of its own, or even civil war. Thus, addressing market
failures in this setting without appropriate consideration of political consequences may
be ine¤ective or even counterproductive in broad social welfare terms.
Policy Reform, Instability and Violence
The experience of Ghanas Prime Minister in 1971, Ko Busia, illustrates that policy
advice should take into account that politicians face political constraints, and that in this
case as well, good economics is not necessarily good politics.
Busia had come to power in 1969 after the military junta, which had ejected the
increasingly autocratic government of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966, had nally given up
power. Busia immediately faced a deep economic crisis, underpinned by unsustainable
expansionary economic policies, distortionary price controls implemented through mar-
keting boards, and an overvalued exchange rate. But these policies were not adopted
because Ghanaian leaders, Busia included, believed that they were good economics. Nor
were they embraced as a way to develop the country. They were chosen to satisfy political
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constraints. The expansionary economic policies and overvalued exchange rates enabled
Busia and his predecessors to transfer resources to urban groups. Price controls also had
a strong political logic rst recognized by Batess classic (1981) book: market distortions
and price controls create valuable rents which can then be allocated to generate political
support. Ghanaian pricing policies squeezed agriculture, delivering cheap food to the
politically more powerful urban constituencies, and generated revenues which nanced
government spending and lined politicianspockets.
But these policies did mean that balance of payments crises and foreign exchange
shortages, as well as economic recession, became unavoidable. To outside institutions
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the problem and
its solution were clear: distortionary policies had to be removed. Faced with economic
crisis and international pressure, Busia caved in and signed an agreement with the IMF
on December 27, 1971, which included a massive 44 percent devaluation of the currency.
Whatever the textbook economic logic behind the reforms, the political outcome was
dire. The devaluation was followed by rioting, continuous demonstrations and discontent.
Two weeks after the announcement of the devaluation, Busia was overthrown in a military
coup, which immediately reversed the devaluation. State controls over prices, wages,
marketing boards and exchange rates were the heart of a Ghanaian politicians patronage
network, and any politician who lost the support of this network was susceptible both at
the polls and against the military.
The combination of policy reform followed by violence in Ghana is not an isolated
instance. As Herbst (1990) and Reno (1995, 1998) have pointed out, there is a general
pattern in countries across West Africa of policy reform being followed by violence: indeed,
one reason that policy reform is so seldom implemented in Africa (van de Walle, 2001) is
because politicians know that it is expected to lead to the breakdown of political order.
Renos (1995, 1998) analysis of Sierra Leone is telling. After the rise to power of
former Minister of Mines Siaka Stevens and his All Peoples Congress Party in 1968,
a political compact emerged in Sierra Leone based on the creation and distribution of
rents. Patrimonialism and redistribution of these rents was perfected to a ne art by
Stevens, who manipulated traditional political institutions such as the chieftaincy and
bought support on a massive scale using rents, patronage and jobs.
Stevens ruled until 1985 when he gave way to his hand-picked successor JosephMomoh,
who ruled the country until he was overthrown by a military coup in 1992. Barely any
public goods were provided in the country in the 40 years prior to the end of the civil
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war and re-democratization in 2002. The roads fell to pieces and schools disintegrated.
National television broadcasts stopped in 1987 when the transmitter was sold by the
Minister of Information, and in 1989 a radio tower which relayed radio signals outside
Freetown fell down, ending transmissions outside the capital (Reno, 2003, p. 48). The
Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board had a monopsony over all export crops and paid
farmers very low prices as low as 40 percent of the world level (Davies, 2007). The
exchange rate was massively overvalued, creating a black market. GDP per capita fell
almost monotonically from the early 1970s onwards and reached about 40 percent of the
level recorded at independence by the end of the civil war in the early 2000s (Davies,
2007).
But ironically, Reno argues that attempts by the international community to improve
the economic policies of Sierra Leone had the unintended consequence of intensifying the
existing violence and arguably even pushing the country into a bloody civil war. Sierra
Leone rst called in the IMF in 1979, and after that entered into a long series of nego-
tiations. As its economy declined in the 1980s, the governments need for international
resources escalated, but the problem from the point of view of President Momoh was
that scal responsibility and budget cutting in this context only hastened the urgency of
nding alternative means of ensuring associatesloyalty(Reno 1995, p. 156). More im-
portantly, Momoh was losing resources to enforce political control. As revenue shortfalls
and IMF austerity measures shut down parts of the state bureaucracy that had survived
... Momohs allies sought other means of supporting themselves as they lost access to
benets ... The president could no longer control disobedience ... The reform of bad
policiesneither restored the presidents political control, nor tapped entrepreneurial en-
ergieswhich were now directed at evading the presidents authority. (Reno, 1995, p.
161).
In short, well-intentioned economic policies imposed on the regime by economists try-
ing to redress market failures and policy disrortions robbed President Momoh of the
instruments he had used to buy political support. As a result, he switched to a di¤erent
political strategy, substituting direct force and coercion for buying people o¤. In Jan-
uary 1990, Momoh launched Operation Clean Slatewhich was in e¤ect an attempt to
use the army to take over the diamond mining areas. Without the usual instruments of
patronage, such as public sector employment and contracting, Momoh turned to coercion
to try to grab what rents remained in the country. The resentment this caused in the east
helped to fuel a bloody ten-year civil war (Richards, 1996). Though Momohs regime was
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clearly extractive, kleptocratic and repressive, the subsequent civil war was certainly not
the intended objective or a desirable outcome, and Renos analysis highlights how unin-
tended political consequences are commonplace when reform is imposed from the outside
without understanding the political equilibrium and the political incentive compatibility
constraints on the ground.
Rents and the Natural State
The recent book by North, Wallis and Weingast (2010) also indirectly underscores that
the good economics is good politicsdictum is fallacious by providing several counterex-
amples in the context of what they call the natural state.In their conceptual framework
for explaining economic development, they argue that there is a basic dichotomy between
two types of social orders: open accesscharacterized by economic development, democ-
racy, rich and vibrant civil society with lots of organizations and widespread impersonal
social relationships, including the rule of law, and secure property rights; and limited
access characterized by poor economic growth, a small number of organizations and
social relations along personal lines with privileges, unequal enforcement of laws and in-
secure property rights. All social orders, they argue, are constructed to control the threat
and use of violence, but they do so in di¤erent ways with di¤erent consequences for eco-
nomic incentives and development. In particular, a natural state is a limited access order
where the key to controlling violence is the creation of rents. Echoing Batess analysis we
discussed above, they write (p. 17):
[S]ystematic rent creation through limited access in a natural state is not
simply a method of lining the pockets of the dominant coalition; it is the es-
sential means of controlling violence. Rent-creation, limits on competition,
and access to organizations are central to the nature of the state, its institu-
tions, and the societys performance. Limiting the ability to form contractual
organizations only to members of the coalition ties the interests of powerful
elites directly to the survival of the coalition, thus ensuring their continued
cooperation.
In the world of the natural state limited access orders, which they claim is a general
model for the political economy of poor countries good economics is almost never good
politics. As North, Wallis, Webb and Weingast (2012, p. 18) put it: Because elites know
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that violence will reduce their own rents, they have incentives not to ght. Furthermore,
each elite understands that other elites face similar incentives. In this way, the political
system of a natural state manipulates the economic system to produce rents that then
secure political order.They summarize their argument by stating (p. 7):
[T]he appropriate counterfactual from eliminating rents is not a compet-
itive market economy ... but a society in disorder and violence.
Concluding Remarks
There is a broad even if not always explicitly articulated consensus amongst economists
that, if possible, public policy should always seek ways of reducing or removing market
failures and policy distortions. In this essay, we have argued that this conclusion is often
incorrect because it ignores politics. In fact, the extant political equilibrium may crucially
depend on the presence of the market failure. Economic reforms implemented without an
understanding of their political consequences, rather than promoting economic e¢ ciency,
can signicantly reduce it.
Our argument is related to but di¤erent from the classical second-best caveat of Lan-
caster and Lipsey (1956) for two reasons. First, it is not the interaction of several market
failures but the implications of current policy reforms on future political equilibria that
are at the heart of our argument. Second, though much work still remains to be done
in clarifying the linkages between economic policies and future political equilibria, our
approach does not simply point out that any economic reform might adversely a¤ect fu-
ture political equilibria. Rather, building on basic political economy insights, it highlights
that one should be particularly careful about the political impacts of economic reforms
that change the distribution of income or rents in society in a direction beneting already
powerful groups. In such cases, well-intentioned economic policies might tilt the balance
of political power even further in favor of dominant groups, creating signicant adverse
consequences for future political equilibria.
We are of course not the rst ones to point out that the political economy of economic
policy matters, nor that a standard cost-benet framework for the analysis of policy is
inadequate because it leaves out politics. Since the 1980s, a vibrant literature in political
economy has sought to develop positive models of how policy actually gets chosen, which
involves modelling politics and the decision-making process (for overviews, see Drazen,
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2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Besley, 2007; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). That
being said, existing political economy analyses either do not focus on this question or
else emphasize that, if politically possible, market failures should be removed. Dixit
(1997) and Drazen (2002) have argued that policy (or institutional) advice must be given
in a way that takes seriously the constraint that policy is chosen as part of a political
equilibrium implying that policy advice should be tempered by what is incentive com-
patible for politicians. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge our main argument
in this paper has not been made before. Our argument is that economic policy should
not just focus on removing market failures and correcting distortions but, particularly
when it will impact the distribution of income and rents in society in a direction that
further strengthens already dominant groups, its implications for future political equilib-
ria should be factored in. It thus calls for a di¤erent and explicitly political economy
based framework for the analysis of economic policy. Much of the conceptual, theoretical
and empirical foundations of such a framework remain areas for future work.
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